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Phythian. New York: Routledge, 2013. ISBN 978-0-415-81175-0.
Illustrations. Contributors. Select Bibliography. Index. Pp. ix,
167. $44.76.
Mark Phythian has recruited the top academics in the Intelligence field to
address that never-ending question: How useful is the intelligence cycle? On
the one hand, all of the authors point out that the cycle isn’t entirely accurate.
It’s definitely missing a few steps and/or (depending on one’s position in the
cycle), simplifying the process. On the other hand, the authors acknowledge
that its replacement is far from uniform. The problem is in picking one’s
poison: inaccuracy or hyper-complexity. If the cycle is too simple to be
accurate, then intelligence professionals and observers need an alternative. If
the cycle is entirely accurate, then it is likely too complex to be useful. Given
the multiple agencies, varied systems, conflicting objectives, and demanding
customers across many interested nations, one cycle may not fit all. This
book presents more than one replacement — some simpler than others —
which is, of course, the problem with which we began.
Understanding the Intelligence Cycle gives readers some background on the
choice of metaphors for the cycle, as well as multiple substitute options. The
background comes from historian, Michael Warner, who tells us that cycle
started when French revolutionaries needed a means to explain intelligence
collection to their increasingly specialized military staffs. Indeed, it was the
voracious appetite for intelligence during wartime in Europe from the 18th
and 19th centuries that moved military organizations to codify their
intelligence processes into a flexible yet accurate description of their behavior.
Warner asserts that the graphic depiction of a cycle became a popular
talisman even as governments moved beyond the simple linear process it
described. Omand agrees that the current intelligence cycle may have
outlived its usefulness. Its static reflection of the roughly equivalent and
stalemated world during the Cold War is outdated. We may want to keep the
current cycle, he posits, but it will need to be augmented with situational
awareness, explanatory value, prediction, and strategic notice. He submits
that these additional complexities will make the cycle more responsive to
external demands and changing social attitudes.
As currently used, the Intelligence Cycle is a constant, reiterative, cyclical
feedback loop that neatly describes a step-by-step, time consuming process
that accommodates the information needs of government decision makers
with the capabilities of the providers. It typically has four or five steps
involving: 1. Planning, 2. Collection, 3. Processing, 4. Analysis, and 5.
Dissemination. In the digital, speedy, information age, when collectors work
simultaneously with the analysts, and consumers use and consume more
information than ever, Phythian asks how relevant is the cycle. Information
has become a firehose, and the cycle can’t handle it. Is it time to move beyond
the cycle, and what would replace it?
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Some authors substitute a web for the cycle. From Gill and Phythian, we
learn that the extreme simplicity of the linear cycle is outdated and unhelpful.
Intelligence is collected, analyzed, distributed, and used at multiple, complex
levels, and the cycle should reflect that modern entanglement with a web.
Their web is accurate and complicated, including at one point, no fewer than
thirteen caveats, illustrated with no fewer than seventeen arrows, indicating
multiple directions and descriptions.
Richards substitutes a Venn Diagram for the cycle. Simplifying the current
cycle, he focuses on the two main parts: policymakers and intelligence
producers. The diagram compresses collectors and analysts into one side so
that we don’t need to distinguish raw and finished intelligence. His model
focuses on the questions and the answers, arguing that it doesn’t need more
than that to aid intelligence professionals in their jobs.
Some authors substitute a multi-directional loop for the cycle. This resembles
a juggler riding a unicycle while multiple plates whirl about. As the alternative
cycles pile up for the reader’s consideration, the complexity induces one to
wonder whether the cycle is necessary at all. Do we really need a cycle to
describe how intelligence works? Might we just be able to collect, disseminate,
analyze, and direct intelligence without a graphic depiction of the enterprise?
The essay by Davies, Gustafson, and Rigden throws this thought out the
window by describing the 2009 UK Ministry of Defence attempt to review the
old cycle and create a new, universally acceptable paradigm for joint military
use across multiple nations. Their focus on core functions tells us that the
process is just as important as the product because the cycle is continuous,
not linear. After a lengthy treatment of its advantages and disadvantages, we
learn that the 2009 review process stuck with the image of a cycle but added
multi-directional arrows and a starburst of feedback and dialogue to more
accurately reflect what is happening, as well as what should happen, in the
intelligence process.
Brantly’s cycle is focused on a new threat: cyber warfare. He argues that the
current cycle is defensive and reactionary, and it needs to both push
intelligence into the cyber arena and pull intelligence out of it. The resulting
need to have an inductive quality prevents the intelligence cycle from
enforcing one theoretical approach on all intelligence; it must respond to the
new threats.
Sheptycki applies the cycle to another specific area of security: police work.
He agrees that the uni-directional nature of the current intelligence cycle
hinders the creativity and inductive quality of good policing. Rather than
focusing on management guided intelligence collection, or the simplistic
equation of threats and responses, policing needs to be oriented around
human security.
Strachan-Morris tells us that intelligence in the corporate world tends to
reflect business requirements on an “as-needed” basis. Thus, the static
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depiction of our current cycle misses out on relationships; it’s not fast enough
to assimilate changing needs.
Arthur Hulnick proposes a matrix model with four main tasks: collection,
analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. There are two ways of
accomplishing these tasks: process and sequence. Process tells us that
intelligence duties are conducted in parallel to each other, not sequentially.
Sequence, meanwhile, shows us that none of intelligence works in isolation.
All tasks, all processes, are in motion simultaneously. If we cannot
incorporate concurrent feedback and influence in our model of intelligence
operations, then we are too far removed from reality to be helpful.
Let’s return to our original question: How useful is the intelligence cycle to
our current operations? To answer that question, if the intelligence cycle is
supposed to accurately depict how governments learn and react to new
information, then this book tells us that the cycle has to change. If the
intelligence cycle is supposed to show how intelligence ought to be collected,
analyzed, and disseminated, this book again tells us that the cycle has to
change. So, we have to conclude that the cycle is not especially useful, and
every author in this book agrees that it needs an overhaul.
To the un-initiated, this book may seem too detailed and arcane. To the
intelligence newcomer, it may even appear overly self-absorbed. Indeed, the
edited book is accurate, possibly to point of tedium. Understanding the
intelligence cycle is a central question in academic circles, and this book is
right there in the middle of the literature, but does it need to be so detailed?
Phythian thinks so, and this book accurately reflects the debates, alternatives,
second thoughts, regrets, and hopes that intelligence observers — both inside
and outside government — have pinned on the intelligence cycle and its
alternatives. Ultimately, though, it falls short of offering a universal
conclusion as to what to do next.
Cynthia Nolan, American Military University

116
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

